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Abstract: As social and political life increasingly takes place on social network sites, 
new epistemological questions have emerged. How can information disseminated 
through new media be understood and disentangled? How can potential hidden agendas 
or sources be identified? And what mechanisms govern what and how information is 
presented to the user? By drawing on existing research on the algorithms and interfaces 
underlying social network sites, this paper provides a discussion of Facebook and the 
epistemological challenges, potentials, and questions raised by the platform. The paper 
specifically discusses the ways in which interfaces shape how information can be 
accessed and processed by different kinds of users as well as the role of algorithms in 
pre-selecting what appears as representable information. A key argument of the paper is 
that Facebook, as a complex socio-technical network of human and non-human actors, 
has profound epistemological implications for how information can be accessed, 
understood, and circulated. In this sense, the user’s potential acquisition of information 
is shaped and conditioned by the technological structure of the platform. Building on 
these arguments, the paper suggests that new epistemological challenges deserve more 
scholarly attention, as they hold wide implications for both researchers and users. 
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Introduction 
 
Through a series of publications, Jessie Daniels has studied so-called cloaked websites 
(2009a, 2009b, 2014). These are websites in which the authorship and underlying agendas 
guiding the dissemination of particular contents are deliberately disguised in order to 
manipulate users. Examples of this type of online propaganda include websites such as 
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www.martinlutherking.org (Daniels, 2009a, 2009b) and www.teenbreaks.com (Daniels, 
2014). The first of these websites appears to be an educational site about Martin Luther King 
but is actually run by members of the Ku Klux Klan in order to promote white supremacy. 
The latter appears to be an educational site about abortion but is actually run by a religious 
anti-abortion organisation attempting to manipulate users’ views on the topic. What both of 
these sites share, however, is the strategic use of media in order to disguise information under 
false pretences. They are both ways of sharing and circulating a particular ideological agenda 
under the guise of either objectivity or political neutrality. 
  
One of the most interesting arguments prompted by Daniels’ research has to do with what she 
terms as emergent “epistemological challenges” linked to the circulation of content through 
media. Daniels (2014: 143, our emphasis) argues (we quote at length):  
 
The fact that people believe the misstatements, half-truths, and lies on cloaked sites 
highlights the unique epistemological challenge of activist websites in the digital era. 
Before the Internet, we relied on a system of gatekeepers such as editors, publishers, 
broadcasters, and librarians, all of whom mediated information for knowledge seekers. 
The rise of the popular Internet has not eliminated these gatekeepers, but it has opened a 
new venue for a kind of publishing that is not mediated by any sort of vetting process. 
Mostly, this opens new opportunities for a wider range of ideas to be shared by a broader 
array of groups and individuals; and, at the same time, it raises some disturbing questions 
about how we acquire and verify knowledge.  
     
According to Daniels’ (2014) argument in the quote above, it has becomes increasingly 
difficult to evaluate how and to what extent information can be regarded as valid or truthful 
within new mediated environments. New media, Daniels suggests, provides new means to 
manipulate, filter, and broadcast both truthful and purposely false information.  These 
emergent epistemological challenges are directly tied to reconfigurations in who acts as 
gatekeepers and how information may be distributed through digital platforms.  
 
In our view, Daniels’ (2014) arguments point towards an object of study that is yet to receive 
a systematic scholarly attention, namely the epistemological challenges introduced by new 
media at large. Although Daniels (2009a, 2009b) did not frame her analysis in this way, what 
essentially seems to be at stake in her argument is a question concerning the interplay 
between technological platforms, understood as complex assemblages of codes, algorithms, 
design, user behaviour and content, and epistemology. It is, in other words, a question of how 
information processes – such as the circulation, validation and selection of information – are 
shaped, modulated, and mediated through the complex socio-technical networks forming in-
between human and non-human actors.  
 
If we take Daniels’ arguments seriously, this leads to the introduction of a new and exciting 
series of questions tied directly to notions of knowledge, information, and media. What is 
implied by Daniels’ reasoning is that fundamental philosophical questions of what we can 
know and how we can know it – explored from Descartes to Kant and beyond – may take on 
new and particular forms in the digital era. Yet, at the present moment, it would seem that the 
full contours of this very wide terrain of inquiry are yet to be properly explicated. How does 
new media reconfigure and change our ways of evaluating and assessing information? And, 
equally important, how and to what extend does the adaptation of different media provide us 
– both as researchers and users – with new epistemological doubts and challenges?  
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Questions concerning the ways in which codes, protocols, and algorithms shape and 
condition our behaviour, potential modes of interaction, and (in the end) subjectivity have 
increasingly come into view as important topics of research (Berry, 2011; van Dijck, 2013, 
2014; Bucher, 2012a, 2012b, 2016a, 2016b; Skeggs & Yuill, 2015, 2016; Pasquale, 2015; 
Langlois et al., 2009). Rather than resorting to naïve technological determinism, this body of 
research – of which the above list is only vaguely indicative – has provided highly productive 
and often very complex insights into the ways in which new media platforms should not be 
approached as merely neutral tools, but rather as active agents in their own right. As material 
environments enveloping our everyday life, media play a highly important part in 
conditioning our acquisition and evaluation of information. This sentiment is echoed by 
Milan (2015: 8) in her study of mediated protest: ”Evoking the ‘material’ of (…) social media 
in the analysis of contemporary collective action has epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological consequences. It impacts the way in which we can learn about and make 
sense of contemporary protest”. 
 
In this paper, we wish to take the above body of research as our point of departure. Drawing 
on this research, we will reflect upon and discuss what may broadly be understood as the 
epistemological dimensions and challenges of information processes on social network sites, 
specifically in the case of Facebook. We will investigate the conditions for evaluating 
information, the human and non-human actors selecting, filtering, and circulating 
information, and the implications of these processes for the evaluation and assessment of 
information. Rather than a large-scale philosophical argument, we will discuss these 
questions from a medium-oriented point of view. We wish – to distil our approach to its core 
– to discuss information construction and circulation from the viewpoint of interfaces, 
algorithms, and user-platform interactions. By drawing attention to how the underlying code, 
materiality, algorithms, and interface shape how information is processed, presented, and 
filtered, we will try to elucidate the connection between epistemology and media 
technologies. The goal of this paper, then, is to contribute to this emerging field of research 
by expanding and explicating the range of epistemological questions prompted by new media 
technologies such as Facebook.  
 
Some key clarifications should be made from the outset of this paper. First of all, we are not 
using the term epistemology in a strong Kantian sense to imply the internal (cognitive) 
mechanisms entailed in the processing and understanding of information and sense-
experiences. Instead, we attempt to interrogate the ways in which information processes are 
shaped within complex assemblages of human and non-human actors. Specifically, in the 
case of this paper, in the context of Facebook as a simultaneously communicative, cultural, 
and material infrastructure through which information flows are circulated amongst and 
between human and non-human actors alike. In this sense, our use of the word epistemology 
does not imply a basically cognitive or psychological frame of reference. Instead, our focus is 
on the ways in which information can and is processed through both the codes, algorithms, 
and technological infrastructure provided by Facebook, and the potential engagement and 
production of information provided by users. This also means that what is attempted here is 
not a Kittlerian argument concerning the ways in which media has altered and shaped 
subjectivity across history (Kittler, 1999). In a much more modest way, our intention is to 
reflect upon the ways in which platforms like Facebook act as active agents in the co-creating 
and shaping of how information can and is presented, distributed, and made available.  
 
Second, in pursuing this particular perspective, we are not (first and foremost) interested in 
the various ways in which circulated information may be more or less “true”, referring to 
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more or less true states. Instead, following an actor-network inspired approach (Latour, 
2005), we are much more interested in the dynamic processes entailed in the continuous 
socio-material configuration and re-negotiation of information. This does not mean that 
questions of “truthfulness”, “representation”, and “interpretation” are not valid or important, 
but simply that they are beyond the initial scope of this paper. 
 
And third, we should also state from the very beginning that a number of the specific claims 
and arguments made throughout this paper do not necessarily describe “new” features 
suddenly brought about by the rise of Facebook as an ubiquitous social media. We are, 
indeed, very sceptical of such claims of radical newness. Yet what is important – and this is 
the main presumption of this paper – is the notion that Facebook does modulate or re-
configure already-known themes and questions. As Jessie Daniels highlighted in the quotes 
above, new media can alter the constellation of gatekeepers, algorithms, interfaces and so on, 
offering new possibilities and conditions for the circulation and evaluation of information. It 
is precisely this particular modulation that we attempt to explicate in this essay. This, in turn, 
is the intention of this paper: not to provide a final answer, but to clarify and explicate the 
ways in which epistemology and the processing of information is modulated with the 
implementation of new media.  
 
 
What is Beneath a Page? 
 
We want to open this paper with an anecdotal example taken from the Danish general 
elections in 2015 where Danish citizens had to elect their next prime minister as well as the 
individual Members of Parliament. During this campaign, a screenshot from a post within a 
secret Facebook group belonging to The Conservative Youth Party was leaked within the 
Danish mass media. The post, containing a link to a public Facebook page called ‘Remember 
to Vote’, read: 
 
CONFIDENTIAL!! We have created this page and Facebook event, where we will try to 
mobilize young voters during the election campaign by first posting neutral content in the 
first phase of the election and then posting content related to key issues of The 
Conservative Party in the last phase … We really hope that you will support the page and 
like and share our posts. You are also welcome to invite you friends, also from other 
parties, so we can reach the wider public, but we underline that it is confidential who is 
behind the page. (Facebook post, 27 May 2015)  
 
What this post revealed was a sophisticated political tactic: by utilizing a Facebook page in a 
certain predefined, yet confidential, manner, the Conservative Youth Party would try to 
manipulate young voters in their direction. They would, as outlined in the secret post, 
deliberately frame and manipulate the information presented to their audience in a certain 
pre-conceived way. 
 
This leaked post is interesting for a number of reasons: not just because it showcased how so-
called secret groups on Facebook may be utilized in order to organize and carry out hidden 
operations, but also because it pointed towards a general epistemological problem: how can 
users know the source and intention behind information distributed and circulated through 
public Facebook pages? How can we know the underlying procedures governing public 
information spread through Facebook? 
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In this case, it became clear from the leaked information that underneath the public page there 
was to be a clear-cut strategy for how information should be presented. This information, 
rather than given in its entirety for the user to evaluate, would be pre-selected and curated in 
such a way that it would point the users in a specific political or ideological direction. Such 
withholding of political intention in order to manipulate users is, of course, nothing new, and 
the question of un-identifiable intentions is not a new one either, as this may also be the case 
with newspapers, television, books, and other media. However, what is potentially new is the 
extent to which Facebook – as a material and technological infrastructure – accommodates 
this form of mal-intentioned distribution of partial information. It is, to put it somewhat 
crudely, simply very easy for admins to curate, moderate, and selectively present information 
to users. What is equally important to note is how these technological functions – the ability 
to curate and create public pages – are no longer tied to particular gatekeepers or uniform 
centres of power. Instead, they are distributed to a potentially wide range of actors who may 
use online infrastructures, such as Facebook, to disseminate false or manipulated information.   
 
We will explore the technological dimensions of this argument further below, but for now we 
wish to simply point towards some broader observations that can be generalized from this 
anecdotal piece of evidence: namely that what is given, through social media such as 
Facebook, as public information may be governed by and organized through a whole range of 
preceding mechanisms. The user cannot be sure that the information is presented in its 
totality nor if the source of the information is accurate. As we shall return to in the last part of 
this paper, part of these mechanisms are directly tied to the interface and material constitution 
of Facebook as a platform. Yet, what these observations also pointed towards was a broader 
questioning of the conditions and potentials for epistemological doubts related to Facebook 
and other social network sites. For research, we argue, these observations should be 
considered carefully. While technological platforms such as Facebook and Twitter offer great 
opportunities for collecting and analyzing very large corpus of data – in the form of tweets, 
posts, updates, likes and so on – it remains pertinent that the potential underlying mechanisms 
governing the production of such information are not forgotten. While indeed difficult to 
study, we should not be blind to the observation that collective activity may not merely be 
expressions of spontaneously formed networked publics. There is always the very real option 
that a number of mechanisms have preceded the publication of information. Underneath the 
surface, a number of complex epistemological strategies may be at work. If we fail to 
recognize that Facebook, like all other media (old and new), is not simply an outlet for the 
dissemination of fully explicated and “neutral” information, but rather the outcome of more 
or less conscious selection strategies performed by individuals or collectives, then research 
loses its critical edge. Rather than starting from the presumption that information simply is, 
we should interrogate how it has come to be what it is.  
 
The case discussed above is an example of intentional withholding and manipulation of 
information provided by a small group of first and foremost human actors. Yet, as we will 
argue in this following, these forms of pre-selectivity and concealment of particular 
information can in fact be seen on a number of different levels in the case of Facebook. In 
particular, we argue, when looking at the underlying algorithms governing what is 
represented and representable to the user. It is these issues we turn to in the following section. 
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Algorithms and the Selection of Information 
 
In a recent series of studies, Beverley Skeggs and Simon Yuill (2015, 2016) have begun 
unlocking the underlying set of structural mechanisms governing Facebook’s algorithms. To 
put it somewhat oversimplified, an algorithm can be understood as “a finite list of well-
defined instructions for calculating a function, a step-by-step directive for processing or 
automatic reasoning that orders the machine to produce a certain output from given input” 
(van Dijck, 2011:30). Through the use of custom-designed software, Skeggs and Yuill have 
been able to trace how these algorithms work, including how they collect data, manage news, 
and attempt to redirect attention towards particular forms of content. Skeggs and Yuill (2016: 
388) have done so with an emphasis on “areas of activity where a user’s own actions came 
into contact with the actions of the algorithms that Facebook uses to gather information’’. 
Their findings and methodology are both multiple and advanced, and they provide important 
insights into a series of technological conditions that are often hidden as “business secrets”. 
 
A series of findings from Skeggs and Yuill’s studies, particularly related to epistemological 
doubts in the digital age, is how Facebook – in an attempt to maximize their profit and 
monetization through advertising and collection of data – influence “how your network is 
shaped over time’’ and ‘’how you interact – with whom, when, how’’ (2016: 391). Skeggs 
and Yuill (ibid.) show how this is done in what may be termed a reflexive loop in which the 
platform is “constantly tracking you via Facebook and all other sites (using the APIs)”. In 
short, Facebook’s algorithms, named EdgeRank and GraphRank (van Dijck, 2013: 49), curate 
the content available to the user by filtering out and pre-selecting what and how the user 
should and ought to see, making “[s]ocial networking sites … essentially designed and 
programmable spaces that encourage the user to carry out specific actions” (Bucher, 2012b: 
480). This relates to both content from the user’s “friends” as well as commercial content via 
advertising and pages.  
 
In this sense, algorithms do not only constitute the very technological core of Facebook, its 
machine language, but also “control the ‘visibility’ of friends, news, items, or ideas” (van 
Dijck, 2013: 49). Thus, “social media platforms do not merely transmit content, but filter it 
on the basis of claiming to augment it, thereby making the content more relevant to its 
potential consumers” (O’Callaghan et al., 2015: 460).  
 
At the same time, these algorithms are essentially tied up to the user’s actions, 
communication, and behaviour: the algorithms track, collect, and analyse the user, ensuring a 
continuous feedback loop between user and platform. As long as the user is present, the 
algorithm’s job is never quite finished. Yet, as Skeggs and Yuill (2015, 2016) also show, 
Facebook’s algorithms are not always perfect, and although they will try to match individual 
behaviour with their pre-defined categories, some individuals may be more difficult to collect 
and trace than others. Certain forms of subjectivity will be uncategorizable from the 
perspective of the algorithm. Though multiple algorithms may target different parts of the 
user’s behaviour, the question of algorithms and subjectivity is an important one. If we take 
Skeggs and Yuill’s findings seriously – which suggests that only particular forms of 
behaviour (i.e. those already expected by the algorithm) will yield the “proper” and 
“traceable” results – then this also means that embedded within the machine language are 
pre-existing notions of how subjects should and ought to act. In this sense, the particular 
algorithm does not only hold an embedded form of normativity – designating a particular 
outlook on how the subject should act – but also actively re-enforces this pre-conceived 
notion by operating more or less according to intentions.  
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These different considerations connect – in a very real way – to the question of epistemology. 
The main question prompted by the discussion above is how the individual user can know 
how presented information has become representable at all. It is, in other words, a question 
concerning the underlying, algorithmic mechanisms governing what is deemed information 
(and presented to the user) and what is not. This captures, in many ways, what Gillespie 
(2014: 168) has called the specific knowledge logic guiding algorithmic assessment of 
information, which is “built on specific presumptions about what knowledge is and how one 
should identify its most relevant components.” 
 
In this way, rather than simply mediating, the filtering provided by algorithms – based on 
how the particular user’s network has been shaped over time – has implications for what 
becomes information. Instead of a simple question of information being inputted by one user, 
only to be transmitted or outputted to all the user’s friends, the algorithms are entangled in 
the modulation and presentation of this information. It is in this precise sense, as mediators 
rather than intermediaries (Latour, 2005:39), “whose specificity has to be taken into account 
every time” as their “input is never a good predictor of their output”, that algorithms have 
epistemic implications. 
 
By placing algorithms at the centre of an epistemological questioning, we argue, the focus is 
shifted from information as knowledge or truth to the underlying processes constituting what 
appears as information to the user. To put it slightly differently, it is turned from a question of 
validating already constituted information to a question of how information is pre-selected: 
what procedures go into constituting what appears as information to the user? And on what 
particular normative ideals does this pre-selectivity rest? The answer to this question is 
indeed complex and only partially addressed by the research discussed above. Our aim here is 
simply to explicate the nature of this question, and, perhaps more importantly, showcase that 
this is imminently a question concerning always-already entangled relations between human 
and non-human collectives.  
 
Further expanding this argument, a number of additional considerations should be kept in 
mind. In the case of Facebook, what is presented as information to the user – after the careful 
(pre-) selection provided by the algorithms as discussed above – may indeed still be subject 
to a number of the problems outlined in the first and second section. That is to say, the 
curative role performed by the algorithms should not necessarily be seen as a filter of more or 
less trustful information: disinformation or intentionally manipulated information can easily 
be passed through algorithms. And similarly, in a reverse direction, the pre-selection 
performed by the algorithm should not be equated with the intentional manipulation 
performed by individuals, though it does carry similar traits. Specifically in the sense that 
what is presented to the user as a totality has already been subject to a selection; one whose 
criteria are not directly negotiable or changeable. 
  
Adding to this last argument, we should keep in mind that the user cannot directly change the 
algorithms underlying Facebook. There is no switchboard or modular set of controls. If the 
user wishes to engage actively with the algorithms, she has to engage in careful 
appropriations and potential purposeful misuses in order to trick, take advantage of, and turn 
the structural conditions into productive forces, e.g. by ‘liking’ content that she does not 
really like, abstaining from certain actions, or by using fake names, images, and so forth. 
This, however, appears as a completely different scenario: one that is not given in a 
transparent interplay between user and platform, but rather through a creative exchange that 
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hinges on wilful misuse on the user’s part. As Milan (2015: 4) argues: ‘’Users have 
“mobilized” with some success to counteract this power asymmetry [inherent in Facebook’s 
design], for example, requesting multilanguage services and opposing draconian content 
moderation policies and design choices; they have occasionally engaged in strategic 
litigation. But these initiatives do not really have the ability to corrode the regime and the 
economic model that operate in the back”. 
 
So if we accept that Facebook’s algorithms play a central part in brokering and engineering 
what appears as information, then we must also accept, it seems, that this curation of 
information is never simply the direct output of input provided by other users. Instead, put 
somewhat simplified, algorithms actively shape the potential information that the user can 
come to know based on a particular image or normative idea about what counts as 
information to whom.   
 
 
The Challenge of Algorithms 
 
One of the particular problems or challenges regarding algorithms and the technological 
structure of Facebook is that the technological (and, by extension, algorithmic) dimensions of 
the platform tend to be or become invisible. As van Dijck (2013: 29) states by referencing 
Berry (2011: 4): “As software increasingly structures the world, ‘it also withdraws, and it 
becomes harder and harder for us to focus on as it is embedded, hidden, off-shored and 
merely forgotten about.”  
 
We cannot see the software or the algorithms as carriers of particular intentions or ideals. 
Instead, we tend to simply forget their presence all together. Not only does the algorithms act 
behind the user’s back (so to speak) – which, in the end, is precisely what they are designed 
to do – but there is also a tendency to forget their existence altogether. This forgetting, 
withdrawal, or becoming-invisible of technology is not a new argument, as scholars within 
philosophy, sociology, and information science have discussed the tendency for objects to 
disappear from our active circumspection for a long time (Heidegger, 1962; Bowker and Star, 
1999; Latour, 1996).  
 
However, what is potentially new, in the case of algorithms and platforms like Facebook, is 
the fact that even if one would want to access and comprehend the algorithms, they would 
still be largely inaccessible. In the context of Facebook, they remain so-called business 
secrets, even if research has found ways to reverse engineer or tingle with these systems 
(Bucher, 2012b; Skeggs and Yuill, 2015). Thus, if a user would want to make them even 
slightly visible, this would require – as is evident from the complexities of Skeggs and Yuill’s 
studies (2016) – custom-build software or advanced technical proficiency.  
 
In this sense, algorithms are invisible by design, and not just due to inattentiveness on the 
user’s part. As Bucher (2012b: 1176) argues: ”One of the problems with analysing algorithms 
is their often black-boxed nature. While some components of the algorithm are known (…), 
others remain obscure. We are not seeing completely under the bonnet of the Facebook 
infrastructure”. Thus, Facebook’s algorithms and simple tools (like hammers) are not 
necessarily the same thing. While the hammer may become an object of active 
circumspection (even if this is not the case for its everyday way of being), algorithms are 
rather to be regarded as infrastructural elements working within what is accessible to the user 
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as a tool: they constitute the very core of the equipment, rather than its immediately apparent 
features.  
 
While there is certainly a material dimension to this unreadability – a form of invisibility by 
design – there is also (what we might very loosely term) as a cultural or meaning-bearing 
component to this withdrawal. One way of framing this is by drawing on what Ernesto Laclau 
(1990) – following an appropriation of Husserl – names sedimentation. Designating a process 
of routinization or forgetting, sedimented discourses are arrangements that have taken on the 
appearance of being natural or ahistorical. Sedimented discourses appear self-sufficient, 
objective, and are unquestioned. Yet, the point here, according to Laclau (1990), is that such 
discourses are never merely neutral, but always given through contingent decisions that 
distinguish between what is included and what is excluded: or, in the case of algorithms, what 
is represented to the user and what is not, what counts as information and what does not, and 
how that which is represented (that which is counted) is represented. Sedimentation, then, 
makes structures appear immobile, unchangeable, and normal, while they are in fact always 
the product of historical processes with no innate end-purpose or rationale.  
 
This argument can be taken in two directions: first of all, it may be seen as a tendency to 
forget or neutralize the function of algorithms in our everyday dealings with structures such 
as Facebook. This argument leans towards a culturalist perspective: what is at stake, in other 
words, is the perception and articulation of algorithms on the user’s part. A second approach, 
however, may also be to view sedimentation as a material process designating the black 
boxing of algorithms into neutral and inscrutable voids. In this case, the imperative would be 
to actively open up and reactivate these sedimented black boxes as material entities in order 
to grasp the ways in which they shape our potential knowledge about the world. Or as van 
Dijck (2013: 29, original emphasis) writes: “to make the hidden layer visible and show how 
software is increasingly quantifying and measuring our social and every day lives’’. 
 
Summing up these arguments, the key epistemological challenge related to the algorithmic 
backbone of Facebook is how to make visible that which is invisible by design. This has 
implications from both a research and a user perspective. Seen from the side of the user, the 
question is, as we have attempted to outline in the last part of this section, to what extend 
algorithms take on the appearance of neutrality, to what extent their existence is simply 
forgotten or rendered neutral. In the case of research, what is at stake is rather how to de-
neutralize and unpack these algorithmic black boxes – both on a cultural-meaning level and 
as material entities. Yet, how is this task possible? Is it only computer engineers who can 
come to grasp the epistemological conditions of the digital age? As we will argue below, a 
renewed appreciation for particularly the materiality of social network sites may indeed be 
what is needed.   
 
 
Opening the Black Box 
 
When reflecting on the intricacies of social media platforms and their underlying structural 
conditions, it is easy to get lost in technical language that obfuscates, rather than open up, the 
area of investigation. In discussing the intimate relations between user behaviour, 
epistemology, and technological structures, we should not succumb to a turning everything 
into algorithms, codes, or computational languages, working as silent, complex, and 
inaccessible machines behind the curtain, tracking, producing, and curating the production of 
subjectivity. The problem with completely algorithmitizing social media is that it risks 
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turning them into black boxes, as discussed above. This argument resonates with a number of 
existing critical voices, and as Ziewitz states (by reference to Chun, 2008: 300): ’’Wendy 
Chun, in particular, has criticized an exclusive focus on computer code as ‘‘sourcery,’’ 
suggesting that ‘we need to interrogate, rather than venerate or even accept, the grounding or 
logic of software’’’ (2016: 7). Indeed, in this regard, we should remember that ”[a]lgorithms 
are but one aspect of Facebook’s software assemblage affecting the construction of regimes 
of visibility and invisibility’’ as Bucher (2012a: 1177-1778) argues. So while we should 
algorithmitize our study of social media, this should not lead to a complete reliance on 
algorithms as the sole mechanisms behind such media. Placing algorithms at the centre of our 
inquiry should, in other words, not make us reduce social media to algorithms.  
 
A reverse move is to disassemble not only the platforms but also our conceptual vocabularies. 
Such an approach can be found in the work of van Dijck (2013). Building on actor-network 
theory (Latour, 2005) as well as political economy (Castells, 1996), she suggests a holistic 
view on social network sites as given in the interplay between technologies, users, content, 
business models, governance and ownership. Of particular interest to our discussion of 
epistemology is her further graduation of the technological dimension into five key 
components, named (1) (Meta)data, the content and meta-information about the content of 
the platform; (2) Algorithm, the codes that structure, curate and pre-selects the data and meta-
data; (3) Protocol, the way the platform is governed through its programing; (4) Interface, 
what is controllable and observable to the users (i.e. the visible interface) and to the platform 
owners (i.e. the invisible interface); and (5) Default, automatic predefined settings provided 
to the user, which steer their actions in certain directions.  
 
What these terms offer is a string of concepts that can be used to dis-entangle the multiple 
ways in which technological infrastructures, such as Facebook, operate and guide how and 
what information is processed. The argument that emerges from this conceptual network is 
the notion that everything cannot be reduced to algorithms, however important they still 
appear. When discussing questions concerning epistemology, then, we should also be 
attentive towards these other socio-material components, as they co-structure and co-
construct what and how information can be presented to the user.  
 
In the case of Facebook, a central concern is the extent to which the interface provides 
different opportunities, conditions, and modes of action depending on the user’s role. What 
we are attempting to get at here is essentially the difference between being a user, a page 
administrator, and company owners. As we will argue below, each of these roles corresponds 
to widely different conditions and potential options of information production and circulation. 
This has implications for our epistemological concerns. In the context of transparency and 
openness on social network sites, van Dijck (2013: 47) observes the following: 
 
Platform owners have a vested interest in complete openness on the side of the users; the 
more they know about users, the more information they can share with third parties. (…) 
However, users’ interest is not always served by complete openness; users may want to 
control third parties’ access to the information they voluntarily or involuntarily entrust to 
Facebook. As a result, Facebook has a stake in promoting the first type of mechanism 
while diverting attention from the second type: the more users know about what happens 
to their personal data, the more inclined they are to raise objections. Owners’ power over 
coding technologies thus gives them a distinct advantage over users in the battle for 
information control.  
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While the above quote is dense, its central observation concerns an ambiguity built into 
Facebook’s interface. On the one hand, Facebook wants users to share as much information 
as possible publicly – public information that can then be collected, aggregated, and passed 
off to third parties for economic and monetary purposes. On the other hand, however, users 
do not want to share their information to unknown third parties. So there is a trade-off, on the 
users’ side, between wanting to participate and not wanting to be monetized. The solution for 
companies such as Facebook, van Dijck (2013) argues, has been to create a distinct hierarchy 
and knowledge gap between users and platform owners. The interface available to users, in 
this case, only contains a fraction of the information visible to the company. For example, 
users cannot know who has access to their content or how it is used.  
 
This knowledge gap is mirrored, albeit in a slightly different way, in the relation between 
users and page administrators. In being designed for commercial interests, Facebook provides 
a large set of tools to admins of pages: they can moderate comments, filter out unruly voices, 
manage data, see information about users, remain completely anonymous, and have a distinct 
visual hierarchical position on their page (see Schou et al. 2015; Lillqvist et al., 2015). The 
users, who want to connect and share content, have to accept this fundamentally 
asymmetrical premise: they can never get to know what the page admins know, as they do 
not have the same tools available. This technologically-supported dis-symmetry has 
fundamental consequences for our epistemology interrogation. For if indeed the admin holds 
the potential to moderate and filter information, then what is presented to the user as e.g. 
comments on a given page, may, in fact, be only vaguely indicative of the actual totality of 
content. Furthermore, in being completely anonymously operated, these pages also offer new 
ways of spreading false information with little to no potential consequences for those behind, 
other than perhaps their pages being removed by Facebook. Not only is there not a gatekeeper 
controlling the validity of sources and information, as Daniels (2014) highlighted in relation 
to cloaked websites, but there is also no way of verifying content and sources. In the end, 
there is not even potential retaliation towards those spreading such subversive content. So the 
user operating on Facebook is, indeed, at a distinct disadvantage: a disadvantage that 
essentially has to do with the material constitution of the platform itself. What the user can 
and cannot come to know is conditioned by the material structure and potentials inscribed 
into the platform and its code. Different actors – company owners, page administrators, and 
users – are positioned within different epistemic positions created through a complex 
assemblage of code, materiality, commercial interests, and human agency.    
 
Returning to the example presented at the beginning of this paper – the case of the Danish 
youth party tactically misleading the public – we can see that part of their intentional 
withholding and manipulation of information was in fact tied to the material possibilities 
offered by Facebook. Their ability to structure information was tied up with their 
appropriation of already existing technological potentials. It was because these admits held 
the ability to curate, moderate, and operate under anonymity that they could manipulate what 
and how information was presented to potential users. The youth party, in turn, appropriated 
and exploited the interface provided by Facebook. Now, in this case, algorithms did not 
provide a prominent feature, yet this does not mean that what was at stake was not the 
negotiation between human and non-human actors. In this case, it was simply the interface, 
rather than the algorithms, that provided particular means to control and filter the circulation 
of information. 
 
Overall, to distil our argument to its very core, what we have tried to unfold in this section is 
the notion that the pre-selection of information is not only tied to “silent” algorithms. Rather, 
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as part of Facebook’s interface, there are also numerous potentials for epistemological 
challenges and uncertainties. Not merely being a neutral tool, the different “subject positions” 
– admit, user, owner – offered by Facebook co-structures communicative relations and their 
room for manoeuvrability. This structuring has epistemological consequences for what and 
how information appears to the user, as different types of users will be able to process 
information in fundamentally different ways.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have reflected upon emergent epistemological challenges in the digital era 
using Facebook as our point of departure. What we have attempted with this discussion has 
not so much been to provide fully formed answers, but rather to widen the potential range of 
questions that may be posed in relation to new media technologies. While Daniels (2014) first 
and foremost pointed towards the epistemological challenges related to deliberate 
misinformation, we have tried to suggest the always-already present linkage between 
epistemology, the processing of information, and media. In this sense, our attempt has been to 
broaden the questioning to a wider set of issues with a wider set of implications. It is 
important to underline that the arguments made in this paper are obviously not exhaustive and 
go beyond Facebook as a particular technological structure. Furthermore, we should be 
conscious of the fact that new media do not simply introduce potential challenges to our 
perception of the world but also provide new outlets for information exchange, participation, 
and even protest against oppression. Rather than merely a hindrance, they become a part of 
already existing and necessarily material epistemological networks conditioning our 
processing of information. In this sense, new media modulate rather than obfuscate epistemic 
capacities. With this paper, using Facebook as our particular case, we have attempted to show 
how this modulation takes places vis-a-vis the underlying algorithmic pre-selection of 
information, the interface governing interaction on Facebook pages, and the actions 
performed by human collectives. We have argued that each of these socio-technical processes 
provide complex epistemological challenges. Yet, we have also attempted to problematize 
and reflect upon the intricate nature of algorithms in particular, as important objects of 
research. How can we open up these black boxes without simultaneously fetishizing these as 
the only matter of concern?  
 
Further reflections on this new field of inquiry, we argue, are of fundamental importance to 
understanding the implications of information sharing and circulation on social network sites. 
There is a continuous need to question the complex interrelations between materiality and the 
processing of information. How do media condition, shape and pre-select the information that 
we can come to know? How can these socio-technical processes by excavated and 
disentangled? And how can we develop adequate conceptual vocabularies? As Bucher 
(2012a: 1778) rightly argues:  
 
What is needed is research that not only attends to changes in editorial media practices as 
increasingly delegated to algorithms, but also to the changes in cultural assumptions 
about the nature of social networking that are being built into algorithmic architectures.  
 
With this paper, we hope to have contributed to this exciting field of research by beginning to 
showcase the complex links between material structures, cultural and communicative 
practices, and epistemology. 
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